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ABSTRACT
Autonomous systems – such as self-driving cars, autonomous drones, and automated trains – must
come with strong safety guarantees. Over the past decade, techniques based on formal methods
have enjoyed some success in providing strong correctness guarantees for large software systems
including operating system kernels, cryptographic protocols, and control software for drones. These
successes suggest it might be possible to ensure the safety of autonomous systems by constructing
formal, computer-checked correctness proofs. This paper identifies three assumptions underlying
existing formal verification techniques, explains how each of these assumptions limits the applica-
bility of verification in autonomous systems, and summarizes preliminary work toward improving
the strength of evidence provided by formal verification.
Introduction
Autonomous systems – such as cars, planes, and trains – must come with strong safety guarantees. These systems
are cyber-physical, in the sense that their safety depends crucially upon the way in which their software (“cyber”)
components interact with their kinetic components. Cyber-physical systems (CPS) analysis tools can verify the safety
of CPS by stating correctness specifications in a formal language and then verifying – via computer-checked proof –
that safety-critical software components respect these specifications.
Existing approaches toward formally verifying the correctness of cyber-physical systems focus primarily on construct-
ing formal safety proofs about classical low-dimensional models of control systems. For example, the safety of an
adaptive cruise control system might be established by modeling the dynamics of two cars in terms of their positions
and velocities and then proving that a control policy preserves safe separation between all cars on the road for any time
horizon [15]. Researchers have employed a similar approach for ensuring the correctness of proposed FAA aircraft
collision avoidance protocols [12], the European Train Control System [20], and quadcopters [21]. These proofs are
typically constructed and checked using a cyber-physical systems verification tool such as Flow* [4], KeYmaera X
[8], or SpaceEx [6].
CPS verification tools can provide very strong safety guarantees for cyber-physical systems, but typical techniques for
using these tools rely on three assumptions that break down when applying verification techniques to real autonomous
systems:
1. CPS verification techniques assume that a symbolic representation of the state of the world is known a priori.
For example, formal CPS models of ground robots typically assume that the system knows the positions of
all relevant obstacles, at least within some error bound [16].
2. CPS verification techniques assume that a model of all agents’ decision making processes is known at design
time. The system designer must know what actions the controlled vehicle might take in each state, and
must also know what actions other agents in the world might take in each state. These models can be
nondeterministic, but must be complete in order to obtain meaningful safety results.
3. CPS verification techniques assume that the system designer knows a kinematic model that is accurate enough
to predict the effect each agents’ actions will have on safety-relevant quantities (e.g., position, velocity, etc.).
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One common reaction to this list of assumptions is to give up on rationalist approaches toward safety and focus
instead on building statistical cases for safety. Unfortunately, a purely statistical approach toward safety certification is
intractable. Just as deep reinforcement learning suffers from extreme sample complexity, acquiring sufficient statistical
evidence of safety for self-driving cars requires an unrealistic amount of empirical evidence [13]. More importantly,
in the purely statistical approach, even slight modifications must trigger a complete recertification. Recent fatalities
in both aerospace (737 MAX) and self-driving (Uber Arizona crash) demonstrate the danger of assuming that safety
properties of the original system are preserved under even small modifications. If driving our way to safety is the only
approach toward obtaining safety guarantees, then fully autonomous systems might never be deployed.
Fortunately, pessimism toward formal methods for autonomous control systems is premature. This paper reviews
each of the assumptions listed above and explains how CPS verification techniques can be adapted to address the
problem. In the process, we identify a research program based on symbolic reinforcement learning [10] with domain-
specific safety specifications for vision systems and online program synthesis for adjusting modeling assumptions
during control.
Background
We begin by recalling model-based verification and how formal models can be used to provide safety guarantees for
reinforcement learning algorithms.
Verification of Model-Based Controllers In model-based approaches toward safe control, the engineer designs a
mathematical model of the system’s dynamics. This model is then used to construct a control program that achieves
some control objective. The designer ensures the safety of the system by writing down safety specifications and
constructing a proof that the control program preserves the desired safety specification.
Model-based verification requires a modeling language. One such language is the language of hybrid programs [19],
which is a simple programming language for describing the interaction between control software and physical systems.
The syntax and informal semantics of HPs are as follows:
• α;β executes α and then executes β.
• α ∪ β executes either α or β nondeterministically.
• α∗ repeats α zero or more times nondeterministically.
• x := θ evaluates term θ and assigns result to x.
• x := ∗ assigns an arbitrary real value to x.
• {x′1 = θ1, ..., x′n = θn&F} is the continuous evolution of xi along the solution to the system constrained to
a domain defined by F .
• ?F aborts if formula F is not true.
Safety specifications for hybrid programs are expressed using differential dynamic logic. The formulas of dL are
generated by the grammar:
ϕ,ψ ::= f ∼ g | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ ψ | ∀x, ϕ | ∃x, ϕ | [α]ϕ
where f, g are polynomials of real arithmetic, ∼ is one of {≤, <,=, >,≥}, and the meaning of [α]ϕ is that ϕ is true
in every state that can be reached by executing the program α. Example 1 demonstrates how dL is used to specify the
safety property of a pedagogical model of a car approaching a stop sign.
Example 1 A pedagogical model of a car at position x approaching a stop sign at position m with velocity v and
acceleration a. The car’s maximum acceleration is A and its maximum braking force is b. A time t keeps track of the
time between each control step. The evolution domain constraint on the differential equations specifies that the car
may not move backward and may choose a new acceleration a at most every  time steps. The entire formula states
that no matter how many control choices the car makes or how much time elapses, the car will not pass the stop sign
(x ≤ m)
1 v2 ≤ 2b(m− x) ∧ v ≥ 0 ∧A ≥ 0 ∧ b > 0→
2
[{
3 {a:=−b ; ∪ ?(2 b (m−x ) ≥ v2+(A+b ) ( A2+2v ) ) ; a :=A;}
4 t := 0;
5 {x ’=v , v ’=a , t ’=1 & v≥0 & t≤ }
6 }∗]x ≤ m
2
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Figure 1: System diagram for the FOSSIL framework.
Formulas such as Example 1 can be stated and proven in the KeYmaera X theorem prover [8] by constructing a proof
search tactic [7]. The particular choice of formal logic and verification technology is not essential to the results
presented in this paper. The approach proposed in this paper can be undertaken using temporal logic constraints over
Bu¨chi or Rabin automata, reachability constraints on hybrid automata, or other formalisms.
Formally Constrained Reinforcement Learning End-to-end reinforcement learning algorithms such as proximal
policy optimization [22] learn end-to-end control policies that map directly from sensors to actuation decisions.
Several researchers have suggested approaches toward leveraging logical formulas such as Example 1 to provide safety
constraints on the action space of reinforcement learning algorithms [1, 9, 11, 18]. The basic idea is quite simple: a
monitor is synthesized from a logical formula and the monitor is used to constrain which actions the RL algorithm
may select in each state. For example, an RL agent solving the task considered in Example 1 could always choose to
brake, but could only accelerate in states where 2b(m− x) ≥ v2 + (A+ b)(A2 + 2v) evaluates to true.
We take this prior work on formally safe RL as a starting point for addressing the three challenges identified in the
introduction.
Challenge #1: Acting Safety Without A Priori Perceptual Knowledge
CPS verification techniques largely consider the problem of controlling safely given a priori knowledge about the
values of safety-relevant quantities. For example, CPS models typically assume error-bounded approximations of po-
sitions and velocities for all relevant objects. In the real world, these quantities are only known a posteriori. Properties
such as position and velocity are obtained only by analyzing raw sensory inputs (video, LiDAR, radar).
Consider Example 1. In a real system, the position of the stop sign (m) is not part of the system’s input. Instead, the
system must somehow learn that m is the point at which the car must stop. Autonomous systems that rely on formally
constrained RL for safety must correctly map from sensory inputs into the state space in which safety specifications
are stated. I.e., the system must correctly couple visual inputs to symbolic states.
We consider this problem in recent work currently under submission. Our approach, called FOSSIL, is a symbolic
reinforcement learning algorithm [10] that uses the symbolic mapping to enforce safety constraints. The algorithm
is visualized in 1. FOSSIL extracts the positions of safety-relevant objects from visual inputs and then enforces
safety constraints on the resulting symbolic features. This mapping is achieved via template matching. The symbolic
mapping uses quality-aware template mapping [5, 23, 14].
2 demonstrates how this framework is instantiated on the Atari Road Runner environment. Templates for each safety-
relevant object are used to extract the positions of each object, and then a logical safety monitor is used to ensure that
the positions of these objects do not violate safety constraints.
Unlike many approaches toward verifiably safe reinforcement learning, FOSSIL learns an end-to-end policy network
over visual inputs. Symbolic representations of the system’s state are extracted and used to enforce safety constraints,
but the system is still learning an end-to-end control policy. This is important because safety constraints describe
necessary – not sufficient – conditions on adequate control. Autonomous systems must be safe, but many control
objectives are not necessary or even possible to capture in a symbolic state space.
For example, in the Road Runner environment, the road runner must pick up bird seed. This bird seed is highly
relevant to the reward structure of the game, but is not relevant to the safety objectives of avoiding the car and coyote.
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Figure 2: FOSSIL instantiated on the Atari Road Runner environment.
By enforcing constraints in a symbolic state space but still learning end-to-end policies, we are able to optimize for
objectives that are not represented in safety models.
Future Work on Safe Perception
FOSSIL explains how to couple visual and symbolic states without requiring a full representation of all safety-relevant
features of the symbolic state space. However, FOSSIL does not explain how to ensure that the visual template
matching algorithm (or any other vision system) is robust.
Previous work on verification of deep CNNs focuses on adversarial robustness [3], which is not the only important
specification. Characterizing what it means for a vision system to be correct in general is difficult. However, by taking
into account the underlying control problem in which the perception system is being deployed, we can begin stating
invariants. For example, Pei et al. verify rotational invariants relevant to steering angle in self-driving systems [17].
Most important temporal invariants for autonomous systems are temporal: object permanence, physical plausibility,
invariance to certain changes in rotation and lighting, etc.
Verifying temporal specifications will require advances in verification tooling. CPS verification tools are excellent for
verifying temporal properties, but are designed primarily for analyzing the interaction between the discrete dynamics of
control software and the continuous dynamics of physical systems. Their canonical use-case involves low-dimensional
but highly descriptive kinematic models of control systems. For example, the dynamics of a car or quadcopter might
be modeled using a system of 10-15 differential equations that directly reference the positions and velocities of the
controlled vehicle and any relevant obstacles. Analysis of high-dimensional systems is also sometimes possible, but
only for affine systems and for certain types of specifications [2]. Verification approaches for CNNs do scale to large
dimensions, but do not consider the temporal nature of classification tasks in autonomous systems.
Challenges #2 and #3: Predicting Behaviors and their Effects
Modeling the world is difficult. Even simple control problems often require substantial effort to accurately model.
Most approaches toward safe reinforcement learning enforce constraints on the action space, such as the assertion on
line 3 of Example 1. These safety constraints contain, often implicitly, assumptions about how the world behaves.
For example, line 3 of Example 1 is directly related to the solution to the system of differential equations on line 5 of
Example 1. If those differential equations do not adequately capture the behavior of the car under control, then the
safety constraint given on line 3 is wrong.
Autonomous systems that rely on state-action constraints to ensure safety should reify the modeling assumptions
underlying these constraints. These modeling assumptions should be continually checked at runtime to ensure that
the safety system is not enforcing constraints based upon erroneous assumptions. This principle raises an important
question: what should the system do when detecting a mismatch between expectation and reality?
One answer to this question, explored in [9], is that the system should attempt to “patch” model mismatches by using
the distance between expectation and reality as an objective function. Although this approach seems to work well in
cases where error is small in magnitude and intermittent, it is not a particularly principled approach.
Several researchers have suggested that reinforcement learning algorithms should internalize knowledge about unsafe
actions by penalizing hypothetically unsafe behavior whenever the control policy suggests an action that is rejected
by a formal safety guard. We explore this proposal in the context of FOSSIL and find that doing so decreases overall
4
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Figure 3: Safety generalization ability when penalizing unsafe action attempts. Penalization (“Unsafe Reward” 6= 0)
degrades system performance.
performance and does not succeed in guiding the system away from unsafe states. These results are illustrated in
Figure 3.
Thus, we suggest a more principled approach: the system should attempt to understand the cause of its incorrect
predictions, construct a new model of the world that corrects for these modeling inaccuracies, and then synthesize
new provably correct control logic. We consider this approach in the context of FOSSIL. We introduce a modified
algorithm, FOSSIL+, that is told about its action space and is them left to learn the effects its actions have on the
world. We find that FOSSIL+ constructs far better action space constraints than those provided based upon a priori
modeling assumptions. Although these experiments are exploratory, they suggest that verification-preserving program
synthesis is the most promising approach toward addressing modeling inaccuracies in cyber-physical systems.
Our initial successes with FOSSIL+ and initial failures with optimization-based adaptation techniques suggests that
online program synthesis should play a more prominent role in design of safe autonomous systems.
Conclusion
Current verification techniques are not sufficient for designing safe autonomous cyber-physical systems. Existing
verification techniques assume an accurate model of the world is known a priori and do not consider the problem of
adapting to observed modeling inaccuracies. Our recent work on FOSSIL demonstrates how to integrate symbolic
safety constraints into an end-to-end reinforcement learning system without relying on an oracle for obtaining a sym-
bolic representation of visual inputs. In conclusion, we suggest two broad areas for future work on verifiably safe
learning for cyber-physical systems: verification technology for checking temporal specifications of computer vision
systems, and efficient verification-preserving program synthesis algorithms for hybrid programs.
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Figure 4: Cumulative reward during training for FOSSIL and FOSSIL+.
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